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Reconciling Human Rights and Supply Chain 
Management through Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
Kasey McCall-Smith and Andreas Rühmkorf 
 
I. Introduction 
The negative impact on human rights by business activity has been the focus of much academic 
and public policy debate. In no other field of law has the stubbornness of the public and private 
law divide been exposed more starkly and with such devastating effects for individuals.1 Much 
of the current debate is framed in terms of the intersection between human rights law and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), each of which is associated with a distinct legal field, 
the former with public international law and the latter with private law. In this contribution we 
aim to identify the primary challenges at the intersection between human rights and business 
by dissecting specific legal barriers in the public international law and private international law 
systems. It is intended that by clarifying the most significant barriers in each field, 
                                                 
1
 6HHHJ6/DJRXWWHµ7KH81*XLGLQJ3ULQFLSOHVRQ%XVLQHVVDQG+XPDQ5LJKWV$&RQIXVLQJ³6PDUW0L[´RI
6RIWDQG+DUG,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ¶LQ6/DJRXWWH T Gammeltoft-Hansen and J Cerone (eds), Tracing 
the Role of Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, '.LQOH\DQG5&KDPEHUVµ7KH
81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV 1RUPV IRU &RUSRUDWLRQV 7KH 3ULYDWH ,PSOLFDWLRQV RI 3XEOLF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶  
Human Rights Law Review 447. 
commonalities across the fields will be determined and coordinated responses to overcoming 
these barriers offered in order to develop a stronger response to human rights abuse by business.  
CSR in global supply chains became a prominent topic in recent years due to recurrent 
reports of gross human rights violations at resource collection point or supplier factories. The 
locale where these human rights violations occur are often developing countries whereas the 
companies that source from these suppliers and sell the end product are usually transnational 
corporations (TNCs)2 based in the global North and West. This situation raises questions of 
legal liability which are linked to a determination of the appropriate duty-bearer, 
extraterritoriality, and the law applicable to cross-border TNC activities; all of which are 
addressed from a public and private international law perspective. The legal structure of the 
businesses involved also plays an important role in this regard. It is commonly recognised that 
human rights claims KDYHµWUDYHOOHG¶LQWRWKHSULYDWHODZVHWWLQJDVWRUWFODLPV and criminal 
actions.3  
The management of global supply chains is primarily concerned with the planning and 
organisation of the supply process that ultimately provides the buyer at the head of the chain 
with the goods or parts that they have ordered so as to maximise efficiency in terms of both 
delivery and costs. Preventing violations of human rights in those chains is a matter for CSR. 
This chapter explores the ways in which CSR can reconcile human rights and supply chain 
management. To that end, it will present the extent to which public and private international 
law permit the weaving of human rights accountability into global supply chain management 
and propose how the limits of these two fields could be reconciled. The discussion will be 
complemented by a case study of the smartphone industry, an area which reports frequent CSR 
                                                 
2
 $OVRUHIHUUHGWRDVµPXOWLQDWLRQDOFRUSRUDWLRQV¶ 
3
 2QWKHFRQFHSWRIµWUDYHOOHUV¶VHHWKHFKDSWHUE\G¶$VSUHPRQWDQG*LJOLR in this volume. 
violations in its global supply chains. Following the examination of domestic jurisdictions, 
specifically the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), the authors argue for the 
development of a hybrid regulatory approach to the promotion of CSR, which transcends the 
limitations of public and private international law in supply chain management.  
 
II. CSR and Global Supply Chain Management: The Developing 
Legal Framework 
The CSR of TNCs is a much discussed topic due to frequent examples of irresponsible 
corporate conduct, particularly in global supply chains.4 There is no agreed definition of CSR, 
partly due to the longstanding debate about whether or not CSR is purely voluntary or can also 
be mandatory.5 Notably, in its 2011 communication on CSR, the European Commission 
DGRSWHG D QHZ GHILQLWLRQ RI &65 DV µWKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI HQWHUSULVHV IRU WKHLU LPSDFW RQ
VRFLHW\¶6 This definition supersedes the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V longstanding definition of CSR as 
                                                 
4
 HJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGH8QLRQ&RQIHGHUDWLRQ,78&µ5DLVLQJWKH)ORRUIRU6XSSO\&KDLQ:RUNHUV3HUVSectives 
IURP 86 6HDIRRG 6XSSO\ &KDLQV¶ ZZZLWXF-csi.org/raising-the-floor-for-supply-chain; International Labour 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ,/2µ&RQFOXVLRQV&RQFHUQLQJ'HFHQW:RUNLQ*OREDO6XSSO\&KDLQV¶WK6HVVLRQ*HQHYD
May-June 2016); EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Severe Labour Exploitation: Workers Moving 
within or into the European Union (Luxembourg, European Union, 2015) 59 et seq.  
5
 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQDERXWGHILQLWLRQVRI&65 VHH&9LOOLHUV µ&RUSRUDWH/DZ&RUSRUDWH3RZHUDQG&RUSRUDWH
SociaO 5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶ LQ 1 %RHJHU 5 0XUUD\ DQG & 9LOOLHUV HGV Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2008) 91±93. 
6
 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ µ&RPPXQLFDWLRQIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQWRWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW WKH&RXQFLO WKH
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 
IRU&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶&20ILQDOSDUD 
µYROXQWDr\¶DQGVXJJHVWVDPRUHOHJDOVODQWWR&65WKDWSRWHQWLDOO\HQJDJHVERWKSXEOLFDQG
private international law.7 The new definition recognises that CSR can no longer be considered 
a purely voluntary nor a purely private law consideration because CSR and human rights law 
overlap in several ways.8   
Currently, legal approaches to CSR are widely discussed in the context of global supply 
chains.9 This is due to recent examples of human rights violations that gained widespread media 
attention, including the Rana Plaza building collapse, the Tazreen factory fire and reports about 
forced labour in the Thai fishing industry and on cocoa farms in West Africa.10 Another 
example is the smartphone industry, which is examined below.11 The supply chain (sometimes 
referred to as the µvalue chain¶) includes all the different parties that contribute to the product 
that is sold to the customer.12 It therefore consists of the seller of the end product as well as the 
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 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQµ*UHHQ3DSHU3URPRWLQJD(XURSHDQIUDPHZRUNIRU&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶
COM (2001) 366 final 20. 
8
 .%XKPDQQµ,QWHJUDWLQJ+XPDQ5LJKWVLQ(PHUJLQJ5HJXODWLRQRI&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\WKH(8
&DVH¶International Journal of Law in Context 139, 148. 
9
 See, eg the recent legislation in this area, discussed below: California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 
2010 (US) and the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 s54 on transparency in supply chains. 
10
 Many NGOs currently monitor and respond to the business impact on human rights, eg Business and Human 
Rights Resource Centre www.business-humanrights.org; CORE at www.corporate-responsibility.org/about-core.   
11
 See, eg J Wilde and E de Haan, The high cost of calling: critical issues in the mobile phone industry Labour 
conditions at mobile phone factories in China, India, Thailand and the Philippines (SOMO Centre for Research 
on Multinational Corporations, Report November 2006). 
12
 S Chopra and P Meindl, Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning and Operation 5th edn (Harlow, 
Pearson, 2013) 13.   
manufacturer, retailers, transporters and various sub-suppliers.13 At the head of the global 
supply chain is often a Western TNC, ie corporations that µDUHLQFRUSRUDWHGRUXQLQFRUSRUDWHG
HQWHUSULVHVFRPSULVLQJSDUHQWHQWHUSULVHVDQG WKHLU IRUHLJQDIILOLDWHV¶14 Global supply chain 
operations often reach across multiple countries. The organisation of the supply chain is the 
domain of the supply chain management, which includes the planning and management of all 
sourcing, procurement and logistics activities.15 It also includes coordination and collaboration 
with partners, particularly suppliers. Many examples of gross human rights violations occur in 
resource extraction projects and supplier factories at the bottom of global supply chains, which 
are usually based in developing countries. These suppliers are often subcontractors to 
subcontractors, far removed from the commissioning company at the top of the chain.16 The 
public attention focused on human rights violations at supplier factories has made global supply 
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 ibid. 
14
 This definition of transnational corporations is used by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, www.unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-corporations-(TNC).aspx. Whilst some scholars 
use the terPµWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRUSRUDWLRQ¶RWKHUVSUHIHUUHIHUULQJWRµPXOWLQDWLRQDOHQWHUSULVHV¶7KHUHLVQRDJUHHG
GHILQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPµPXOWLQDWLRQDOHQWHUSULVH¶7KH2(&'*XLGHOLQHVRQ0XOWLQDWLRQDO(QWHUSULVHVVWDWHWKDWD
clear definition was not required for the purpose of the guidelines, but note the following characteristic features: 
µ7KH\ >PXOWLQDWLRQDO HQWHUSULVHV@ XVXDOO\ FRPSULVH FRPSDQLHV RU RWKHU HQWLWLHV HVWDEOLVKHG LQ PRUH WKDQ RQH
country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these 
entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy 
within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, 
6WDWHRUPL[HG¶VHH2(&'Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011 edition) 17. 
15
 For an introduction into supply chain management, see Chopra and Meindl (n 12). 
16
 6HH * /H%DURQ µ6XEFRQWUDFWLQJ LV 1RW ,OOHJDO %XW LV LW 8QHWKLFDO" %XVLQHVV (WKLFV )RUFHG /DERU DQG
(FRQRPLF6XFFHVV¶Brown Journal of World Affairs 237, 245. 
chain management not just an issue of cost saving, but also a reputational concern.17 
µ5esponsible supply chain management¶ FDSWXUHV WKH QRWLRQ WKDW FRPSDQLHV LQFOXGH &65
policies in their supply chain management.18 Part of this responsible supply chain management 
is usually the development of a supplier code of conduct by TNCs which they incorporate into 
their supplier relationships, albeit in different ways and to varying legal effects.19  These 
supplier codes of conduct usually impose a variety of socially responsible terms, such as the 
prohibition of forced labour or anti-bribery policies, on the supplier based on the focus of the 
TNC at the top of the supply chain.   
Critics argue that globalisation enables TNCs to not only diversify and outsource their 
production, but also their legal liability due to the disjointed relationship between public and 
private international law.20 Although CSR is still primarily based on soft law and the voluntary 
engagement of companies, it has, in recent years, gained a more definite legal dimension.21 In 
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 + 3HWHUVHQ DQG ) /HPNH µ0LWLJDWLQJ 5HSXWDWLRQDO 5LVNV LQ 6XSSO\ &KDLQV¶  0 Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal 495. 
18
 See M Andersen and T Skjoett-/DUVHQµ&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\LQ*OREDO6XSSO\&KDLQV¶
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal  VHH DOVR WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V VWudy on 
UHVSRQVLEOHVXSSO\FKDLQV0YDQ2SLMQHQDQG-2OGHQ]LHOµ5HVSRQVLEOH6XSSO\&KDLQ0DQDJHPHQW3RWHQWLDO
6XFFHVV )DFWRUV DQG &KDOOHQJHV¶ %UXVVHOV (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ  ZZZIRUHWLFDRUJZS-
content/uploads/2016/01/Study_Responsible-Supply-Chain-Management_EN.pdf. 
19
 $0LOOLQJWRQµ5HVSRQVLELOLW\LQWKH6XSSO\&KDLQµLQ$&UDQH$0F:LOOLDPV'0DWWHQHWDOHGVThe Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 365. 
20
 $6REF]DNµ$UH&RGHVRI&RQGXFWLQ*lobal Supply Chains Really Voluntary? From Soft Law Regulation of 
/DERXU5HODWLRQVWR&RQVXPHU/DZ¶Business Ethics Quarterly 167. 
21
 This is reflected by the increasing literature on CSR from a legal perspective. See, eg the special issue on Legal 
Aspects of Corporate Social Responsibility (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 1; D 
particular, the home states of TNCs (ie the jurisdictions where TNCs are incorporated) have 
started to regulate CSR, including supply chain issues.22 This approach is in line with the 
recommendations of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights23 (UNGPs) 
which emphasise the importance of TNC home state regulation.24  Examples of this developing 
trend towards home state regulation of CSR include transparency duties such as those in the 
UK Modern Slavery Act 2015,25 the 2017 French Due Diligence Law26 and the California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act.27 In the supply chain context, human rights norms are 
µWUDYHOOHUV¶IURPSXEOLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZWRSULYDWHGRPHVWLFOHJDOV\VWHPV28 Whilst these are 
positive steps towards reconciling human rights and business through CSR, the lack of 
understanding of the basis of CSR principles and the function of international human rights 
                                                 
McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); R Pillay, The Changing Nature of 
Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR and Development in Context ± The Case of Mauritius (Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2015). 
22
 % &UDJJ µ+RPH LV :KHUH WKH +DOW ,V 0DQGDWLQJ &RUSRUDWH 6RFLDO 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ Whrough Home State 
5HJXODWLRQDQG6RFLDO'LVFORVXUH¶Emory International Law Review 735, 751. 
23
 UN Human Rights Council, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
1DWLRQVµ3URWHFW5HVSHFWDQG5HPHG\¶)UDPHZRUN8N Doc A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) (UNGPs). 
24
 ibid, UNGPs, Commentary to Principle 2.  
25
 Modern Slavery Act 2015, s 54(1). 
26
 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d'ordre (1). 
27
 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (California Civil Code Section 1714.43) s 3. 
28
 See the FKDSWHUE\G¶$VUHPRQWDQG*LJOLR in this volume.  
law often lead to the failure of such laws. It is to the public international law dimension of CSR 
considerations that we now turn. 
 
III. The Barriers in Public International Law 
Public international law historically has been defined by the subjects to which it applies²
states, and states alone.29 It is worth noting that international law, in its purest form, 
traditionally excludes those legal issues dealt with by private international law, often referred 
to DVµFRQIOLFWRIODZs¶DVH[SODLQHGLQWKHLQLWLDOFKDSWHUs of this volume.30 This distinction 
between the two fields is directly linked to the subjects and objects of the laws in each field 
and to what extent a state may exercise jurisdiction over a breach of those laws. This section 
highlights the three primary barriers to redress for harmful corporate conduct from the public 
international law perspective: the limited international legal personality of TNCs; the restraints 
of extraterritoriality in existing law; and the absence of binding international law applicable to 
TNCs. 
 
A. TNCs and their Limited International Legal Personality 
In the last half-century, the traditional public international legal system commenced a slow, but 
perceptible, migration away from the idea that states are the sole actors with international legal 
                                                 
29
 M Dixon, Textbook on International Law 7th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 117; R Higgins, 
Problems & Process: International Law and How to Use It (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 12. 
30
 See the Introduction and the chapters in Part I of this volume. 
personality.31 Put simply, the number of international actors active in the international legal 
system has grown. It began with the recognition of international legal personality in individuals 
through courts32 and continued with the creation of binding obligations on states for the benefit 
of individuals through human rights treaties.33 The limited, but nonetheless evident, 
international legal personality of international organisations developed in tandem.34 
International law continues to solidify the expanding cast of actors capable of exercising rights 
and responsibilities at the international level.35 Eventually, a private corporation appeared for 
                                                 
31
 K McCall-6PLWK µ7LGHVRI&KDQJH± 7KH6WDWH%XVLQHVVDQGWKH+XPDQ¶LQ5%DUQHVDQG937]HYHOHNRV
(eds), Beyond Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2016) 219.  
32
 eg Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ, Ser B, No 15, tKH&RXUWKHOGWKDWµWKH
very object of an international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the adoption 
E\WKHSDUWLHVRIVRPHGHILQLWHUXOHVFUHDWLQJLQGLYLGXDOULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQV¶±18. 
33
 eg International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966; 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966. 
34
 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Reports 174, 178±86, 
recognised the UN as an international legal actor capable of possessing rights and responsibilities under 
international law. This idea is reinforced through the capacities granted to international organisations through their 
various founding treaties as well as bi-lateral treaties they agree with states and treaties they agree across both 
international organisations and states, eg, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or between International Organisations, UN Doc A/CONF.129/15 (21 March 1986) 
(not yet in force). 
35
 eg the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3, 10 December 1982, permits private 
companies to enter into licensing agreements with the International Seabed Authority; the 1965 Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 575 UNTS 152FWREHUDUWSHUPLWVµ>D@Q\&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWH
or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that 
effect in writing to the Secretary- General who shall send a copy of the requesWWRWKHRWKHUSDUW\¶3ULYDWHDFWRUV
consideration before the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case.36 In 
Barcelona Traction, the Court reasoned that the powerful role played by economic actors, such 
as TNCs, necessitated due account to be taken of these entities at the international level.37 
Though public international law has not granted TNCs full international legal personality, the 
&RXUW¶V logic resonates in the twenty-first century struggle with CSR and supply chain 
management.  
How to reconcile the two different objects of public and private international law, 
individuals and TNCs, is the question that stands as the initial barrier from the public 
international law perspective. Human rights treaties place a duty on the state to protect 
individuals by outlining specific positive and negative obligations with which the state party 
must comply. International Labour Organization (ILO) treaties equally bind states to 
obligations for the benefit of individuals in the workplace. At no point do these treaties suggest 
that TNCs play the duty-bearer role or fall into the protected object category.38 However, an 
increasing body of case law delivered subsequent to the drafting of these treaties recognises 
the link between corporate action and human rights violations, albeit the tying factor becomes 
the state in order to ensure justice for wronged individuals when direct action against a 
                                                 
are frequently party to international disputes in the area of international economic law, see the chapters by Noodt 
Taquela and Daza Clard and Foster in this volume.  
36
 Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Reports 3. 
37
 ibid, para 39. 
38
 $ *UHDU DQG %+ :HVWRQ µ7KH %HWUD\DO RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV DQG WKH 8UJHQF\ RI 8QLYHUVDO &RUSRUDWH
Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel /DZVFDSH¶Human Rights Law Review 21, 22. 
corporate actor is unavailable under existing law.39 Courts recognise the positive duty on states 
to prevent human rights abuse by non-state actors.40 However, as noted by Mills, treaties are 
not always directly enforceable and, therefore, the positive duty is contingent on the extent to 
which the state has implemented its international human rights obligations in the national legal 
system.41 In terms of business and human rights, it is a breach of this positive duty which has 
enabled judgments to redress some of the harm suffered by individuals at the hands of private 
business, albeit with the state as the defendant and rightfully so where it has been complicit in 
the breach.42  
Before the direct accountability of TNCs for human rights abuse can materialise at the 
international level, as many increasingly demand, the structural deficits in the international 
KXPDQULJKWV V\VWHPPXVW ILUVWEHDGGUHVVHG7KHSUHYLRXVSRLQW UHJDUGLQJ WKH µPDNHUV¶RI
international law must here be re-emphasised²states make international law, both private and 
public, thus it is states that must be convinced first and foremost, as otherwise no real changes 
can begin to take place.    
                                                 
39
 Examples from the European system include: 7DúNLQY7XUNH\ (2006) 42 EHRR 50; Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004) 
41 EHRR 20; Lopez Ostra v Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277. 
40
 See X and Y v the Netherlands, Ser A No 91 [1985] 8 EHRR 235; Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras (Merits), 
Ser C, No 4, (1988) paras 172±75, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights opined that the failure to prevent 
harm by a third party triggered the international responsibility of the state; reaffirmed Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil, 
Ser C, No 149 (2006); Case No 55/96, SERAC and CESR v Nigeria, 15th Annual Report of the ACHPR [2002] 
,+556HH$1RODQ µ$GGUHVVLQJ(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO5LJKWV9LRODWLRQVE\1RQ-state Actors 
WKURXJK WKH5ROHRIWKH6WDWHD&RPSDULVRQRI5HJLRQDO$SSURDFKHVWRWKH³2EOLJDWLRQ WR3URWHFW´¶
Human Rights Law Review  225. 
41
 See the chapter by Mills in this volume. 
42
 Grear and Weston (n 38) 23. 
 B. Extraterritoriality 
The prohibition of applying national laws or international human rights obligations to conduct 
outside the jurisdiction of the state has long been viewed as a procedural impediment to 
addressing human rights abuse abroad, particularly in developing countries.43 This goes to the 
heart of the second public international law barrier. The prohibition on the extraterritorial 
application of national law stems from the principle of state sovereignty, a bedrock principle 
of public international law as outlined in the UN Charter.44 If looking at the traditional actors 
in public international law, both sovereign immunity and the necessity for state consent to 
jurisdiction tend to silence potential human rights claims yet, when viable, state-to-state claims 
are brought on the basis of international law breaches in an appropriate forum.45 An alternative, 
and more readily used option, is an individual action for breach of a human right at the 
domestic, regional or international level and thousands of such claims are raised annually, for 
example, with the European Court of Human Rights.  
 Even where a limited exception exists to extraterritoriality, this is focused on 
individuals, not corporate actors.46 As actors on the international legal plane, TNCs circulate 
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 ibid, 24. See discussion in the chapter by French and Ruiz Abou-Nigm in this volume. 
44
 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, art 2(1); see discussion in the FKDSWHUVE\0LOOVDQGG¶$VSUHPRQW
and Giglio in this volume. 
45
 A recent example includes the Jurisdictional Immunities case (Germany v Italy, Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ 
Reports 99, para 57. 
46
 The classic example being for breaches of international criminal law, see Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 3, 17 July 1998. 
as subjects of private international law yet their conduct has had a marked impact on 
individuals²individuals who hold rights under public international law by virtue of the 
international human rights system. If a TNC operating in its home state breaches the rights of 
an individual in that locus, the individual has the right to access local courts to bring a claim 
for tortious or criminal conduct, depending on the national laws. When the same TNC engages 
in the VDPHDFWLYLW\RXWZLWKWKHKRPHVWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\DJDLQVWQDWLRQDOVRIDQRWKHUVWDWHWKH
µIRUHLJQ-FXEHG¶FODLPLVWULJJHUHG47  
An example of the foreign-cubed claimant is that which the US line of cases starting 
with Filártiga hosted.48 Liability in Filártiga rested on the application of the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS),49 which permits claims to be brought by non-US domiciled individuals for violations 
of the Law of Nations committed outside the US. Until the 2000s, the ATS was used solely to 
address tortious behaviour by individuals. However, a series of cases have experimented with 
the use of the ATS against a corporate actor, such as the infamous example Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum.50 Ultimately, the US Supreme Court concluded that the concept of 
extraterritoriality could not be ignored with the application of the ATS and that any alleged 
DFWLYLW\ PXVW µWRXFK DQG FRQFHUQ¶ WKH 8S in a way that dispels the proscription against 
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extraterritoriality.51 The Court was, however, silent on the issue of whether a corporate actor is 
an appropriate defendant in such a claim. The Kiobel case and others brought under the ATS 
present foreign policy challenges to the US as foreign states think that this over-reach of US 
law could open up foreign government officials to potential civil liability in US courts.52  
From a human rights approach, the barrier erected by the principle of extraterritoriality 
is frustrating in terms of what curative measures would satisfy both extraterritorial human 
rights claims and internal public policy concerns. There are many legitimate reasons for 
denying claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not the least of which considers the already 
extensive pressure put on national systems to process the claims of local citizens already before 
it. Reframing the issue in this way requires prioritisation of human rights claims, domestic 
versus international, which is precisely what should be avoided in light of the 
µLQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVVDQGLQGLYLVLELOLW\¶RIDOOKXPDQULJKWV53  
 
C. Absence of Hard Law Triggers Soft Law Development 
Human rights obligations are set out by treaties at the international and regional levels. As often 
notedWKHVHLQVWUXPHQWVELQGLQJDVWKH\PD\EHKDYHYDULDEOHRUµPDQLSXODEOH¶54 levels of 
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obligation.55 7KLVH[DFHUEDWHVWKHGLIILFXOW\LQIRUPXODWLQJKXPDQULJKWVµUXOHV¶DSSOLFDEOHWR
TNCs. As explained above, TNCs have limited international legal personality and no public 
international law instrument binds a TNC, though some states are working to develop a treaty 
that would do just that.56 Even with this recognition, public policy does not permit the 
international community to ignore certain realities when it comes to human rights and 
business.57 Globalisation ensures connectivity across the planet by enabling communications, 
people and business activity to transcend even the most far-afield borders. The connection 
between human rights and business activity is raised increasingly in international forums.58 
These forums, particularly the UN, deliver a growing body of soft law designed to fill the gaps 
when harder forms of law, such as a human rights treaty, cannot be agreed or there is little will 
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among states to codify new norms.59 The following provides an overview of key soft law 
initiatives currently influencing the human rights and business discourse.  
The UN Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights60 
(UN Framework) and the subsequently adopted UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the UN µ3URWHFW5HVSHFWDQG5HPHG\¶)UDPHZRUN61 (UNGPs) 
offer a roadmap for delegating human rights responsibilities between government and business. 
Together, the UN Framework and the UNGPs provide a common policy framework from a 
multi-stakeholder approach and key to three pillars²protect, respect and remedy²is the 
second pillar, which requires business to respect human rights. Under the second pillar, the 
IXQGDPHQWDO UHTXLUHPHQW IRUEXVLQHVV LV µWRGRQRKDUP¶.62 TNCs, under all circumstances, 
should apply best practice across all operations, including supply chain management, in order 
to prevent human rights abuse. A growing range of states and international organisations 
endorse the UNGPs, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
                                                 
59
 See the chapter by Albornoz and Collins LQWKLVYROXPHVHHDOVR-&HURQHµ7KH7D[RQRP\RI6RIW/DZ¶LQ6
Lagoutte et al (n 1); AE Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2007) 211 et seq.  
60
 J Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporationV DQG RWKHU EXVLQHVV HQWHUSULVHV µ3URWHFW 5HVSHFW DQG 5HPHG\ D )UDPHZRUN IRU
%XVLQHVVDQG+XPDQ5LJKWV¶81'RF$+5&$SULO81)UDPHZRUN 
61
 UNGPs (n 23). 
62
 UN Framework (n 60) para 55. 
(OECD)63 and the International Finance Corporation,64 both of which adopted policies 
reflecting the intersection of business and human rights in line with the UNGPs, yet neither 
oblige businesses to change practices.  
 The legal strength of the UNGPs comes from the obligation on states to protect human 
rights by complying with their pre-existing human rights obligations, thus the UNGPs simply 
reinforce existing international human rights treaties. This necessitates that states strengthen 
domestic laws to accordingly protect against human rights abuse and ensure redress in the event 
that TNCs contribute to human rights violations whether directly or indirectly. While this 
reinforcement of existing commitments is welcomed, it does very little to resolve the barriers 
of applying public international law due to the limited international legal personality of TNCs 
and the principle of extraterritoriality. Therefore, the value of the UNGPs must be examined 
from the perspective of what is most manageable in light of these barriers. Reflecting softer 
forms of public international law, the UNGPs articulate the key to respect for human rights 
through a well-understood business and private law term, due diligence.65 This crossing into 
the realm of private law and phraseology that is second nature to TNCs attempts to link public 
international and private law by clarifying the components to successful human rights due 
diligence.  
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Strip away the human rights language of the UNGPs and what is left is transparency, a 
fundamental component of effective due diligence and a principle that has gained increased 
attention in public international law due to concerns about the democratic deficit in the 
international organisations that facilitate most of the contemporary public and private 
international law development.66 Greater transparency enables regulators to evaluate the 
potential or real harm at every level of an operation²across the entire supply chain²whether 
that activity takes place in the home state or a host state. It is an indispensable tool in bridging 
the divide between public and private law across several sectors and across the supply chain.67 
The fundamental problem with supply chain management is that traditionally it has been only 
the bottom line, the final costs that interest a TNC in a competitive global market. 
Transparency, as set out in soft instruments of public international law, suggests that regulators, 
and ideally stakeholders, are able to trace every element of a product to its roots and that 
national laws will mandate social responsibility with the penalty that consumer choices will be 
altered in relation to the information available or TNCs will suffer business repercussions. 
These repercussions may reveal themselves in cross-border disputes such as those in the 
µIRUHLJQ-FXEHG¶situation introduced above.  
In conjunction with the UNGPs and other business and human rights efforts at the 
international level, a multitude of transparency initiatives have been established, many of 
which are industry specific soft law mechanisms. For example, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) monitors extraction operations in 51 states, including oil, gas 
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and minerals, and suspends compliance certification for states that do not meet articulated EITI 
standards.68 The EITI monitoring focuses on the contracts entered into between governments 
and TNCs, including bilateral investment treaties or home government agreements, to tracing 
the revenue in order to keep all stakeholders fully apprised of how the state is handling its 
natural resource income. The EITI does not specifically deal with extraction practices at the 
most remote end of the supply chain. This reveals the disconnect between top-down and 
bottom-up supply chain management considerations.  
The Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade (PPA) is a recent initiative 
focusing on supply chain management solutions in relation to conflict minerals, particularly in 
the most troubled areas of Africa, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).69 
It is a multi-stakeholder initiative which includes governments, civil society and corporations 
and was spear-headed by the US Department of State and US Agency for International 
Development. Motorola, Nokia and Apple, as well as several communications companies, have 
joined PPA since its founding in late 2011. The PPA was initiated in direct response to section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act,70 US legislation mandating that companies disclose if they use 
conflict minerals (eg tantalum) from the DRC or an adjoining country if the minerals are 
µQHFHVVDU\¶WRWKHIXQFWLRQDOLW\RUSURGXFWLRQRIDSURGXFWPDQXIDFWXUHGRUFRQWUDFWHGWREH
manufactured by the company. Where companies use such conflict minerals they are required 
to report about the exercise of due diligence on the source and chain of custody of their conflict 
minerals, thereby fulfilling the transparency requirement to the best of their ability. 
                                                 
68
 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, beta.eiti.org. 
69
 PPA website, www.resolv.org/site-ppa/. 
70
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, s 1504, Disclosure of payments by resource 
extraction issuers.  
Is transparency alone enough? Though a commendable democratic principle, it has not 
proved to be a cure all nor is it always desirable in public international law.71 Furthermore, it 
is unclear how any negative human rights repercussions resulting from increased transparency 
monitoring might be addressed by current private international law instruments. Transparency 
must be coupled with further, tangible legal ramifications to respond to what is revealed by 
transparency rules. Dodd-Frank and the UK Modern Slavery Act attempt to remedy this to 
some extent; however, as currently drafted, these transparency requirements do not give any 
guidance on how to ensure that individual victims are protected or able to access justice, as 
they are under the private international law regime of the EU, discussed below.    
$UHVRIWODZLQLWLDWLYHVVLPSO\WRRµLQVXIILFLHQWO\FRPSHOOLQJ¶LQWHUPVRIreal human 
rights protection?72 As international discourse and practice continues to expand on these issues, 
the real test will be the ground level protection of human rights, not the professed uptake of 
these international soft law instruments. And while soft law may not be sufficiently compelling, 
it does highlight the tension between the public and private spheres in terms of human rights 
protection. 
 
IV. The Barriers in Private International Law 
The fact that violations of CSR principles in global supply chains regularly occur at supplier 
factories in the developing world raises questions about the access to justice of victims. The 
problem that victims commonly face is that there are often weak legal standards in the countries 
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where the human rights violations occur and/or weak law enforcement mechanisms. From the 
victim perspective, it is therefore important that they have access to remedies. A particularly 
important issue in this context is whether the TNC at the top of the supply chain can be held 
legally liable in tort law, or any other type of law, for the conduct that occurs throughout its 
supply chain, including factories of suppliers and sub-suppliers.73 The violation of human 
rights often also constitutes a tort, for example, where workers are injured due to poor 
workplace health and safety standards, excessive working hours or forced labour.74 Whilst 
gross violations of human rights can also constitute criminal offences, this section will focus 
on tort due to the scope of this chapter on private international law.75  
This section will first analyse the applicable law in cases of human rights violations at 
supplier factories, then turn to the issue of jurisdiction before finally looking at the 
consequences of the legal structure within global supply chains.  
 
A. The Applicable Law 
With regards to the applicable law, the general principle that is traditionally applied by most 
legal systems is the law of the place of the tort (lexi loci delicti).76 This concept is linked to the 
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idea of the territoriality of lawLHWKDWµHDFKVWDWHKDVWKHMXULVGLFWLRQWRUHJXODWHWKHDFWLYLWLHV
WDNLQJ SODFH ZLWKLQ LWV WHUULWRULDO ERXQGDULHV¶.77 However, in the context of supply chain 
liability, transnational tort litigation against the corporation at the head of the chain is an 
attractive avenue for tort victims, particularly when a remedy in the jurisdiction where the tort 
has occurred (eg in this context that is usually a developing country world where the supplier 
factory is located such as Pakistan) is unavailable. Transnational torts claims in the US under 
the ATS are often referred to by proponents of greater CSR as an example of how countries in 
the global West and North could impose extraterritorial liability on their companies for human 
rights violations that occur overseas.78 However, as mentioned above, following the decision 
of the US Supreme Court in Kiobel, it is uncertain to what extent this statute can be used for 
international torts litigation against corporations in the future.79 
In the European Union, the applicable law in claims based on tort law is determined by 
the Rome II Regulation regarding the conflict of laws on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations.80 Article 4(1) of this regulation stipulates that the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage 
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occurs irrespective of the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred and irrespective of the countries in which the indirect consequences of that event 
occur. As an exception to this, Article 4(2) of the Regulation determines that where the alleged 
perpetrator of the tort and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in 
the same country at the time when the damage occurs the law of that country applies. Also, 
where the tort is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than the country in 
Article 4(1) or (2), then the law of the other country applies.81  
The challenge that this legal regime in tort law establishes is that the place where the 
damage RFFXUVLVµQDUURZO\FLUFXPVFULEHG¶82 Recital 17 of the Rome II Regulation establishes 
WKDWIRUFDVHVRISHUVRQDOLQMXU\µWKHFRXQWU\LQZKLFKWKHGDPDJHRFFXUVVKRXOGEHthe country 
where the injury was sustained¶83 Therefore, the usual situation is that when the tort is 
committed outside the UK, the applicable law to decide about the merits of the claim for 
damages will be determined by the law of the place where the damage/injury occurred. In the 
context of human rights violations at supplier factories this will be the law of the country in 
which the supplier factory is based, for example Bangladesh. In many instances, the applicable 
law is not fully developed. Consequently, tort victims in global supply chains must base their 
claim on the law of the country where the damage/injury occurred. They will therefore not have 
access to English tort law, which is well-developed, for example, in terms of law relating to 
workplace injuries. The rules of the Rome II Regulation therefore severely restrict the ability 
to apply English tort law extraterritorially to human rights violations at overseas factories 
which supply goods for transnational corporations in the United Kingdom.  
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As many TNCs commonly incorporate CSR principles such as the prohibition of the 
use of forced labour into their supply contracts with their overseas suppliers as part of their 
supply chain management, it is also important to assess under what circumstances these 
contracts are governed by English law. If the rules of private international law stipulate that the 
contract is governed by English law, then this might lead to greater promotion of CSR due to 
the certainty that the established principles of English contract law provide. If an English court 
hears a contractual dispute in a global supply chain contract involving a UK-based TNC and 
an overseas supplier, the Rome I Regulation will determine whether English law is applicable.84 
Under this Regulation, the parties have the choice to determine the law that is applicable to 
their contract.85 In fact, an analysis of supply chain contracts involving English TNCs has 
revealed that a choice of law specifying English law as the law governing the contract is 
regularly included.86 Contract law disputes regarding the violation of CSR principles in global 
supply chains of English TNCs are therefore likely to be governed by English law. 
 
B. Rules of Jurisdiction 
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Although English tort law is unlikely to be applied to torts that occur at supplier factories far 
down the supply chain, the chances for the victims of those human rights violations to be 
awarded compensation might still be better if English courts have jurisdiction to hear the claim. 
As noted in the previous section, the law applicable to the case may be the law of the country 
where the tort occurred. Usually the place where the tort occurred, or where the damage 
occurred, are also connecting factors for the purposes of jurisdiction, ie they constitute µEDVHV
RIMXULVGLFWLRQ¶+RZHYHUJiven the difficulty in gaining access to courts in many developing 
countries where supplier factories are situated, for example due to corruption, tort victims 
might want to bring their claim in English courts. Hence, the analysis that follows focuses on 
the jurisdiction of the English courts rather than more generally on the different bases of 
jurisdiction potentially available for the victims. 
Four different sets of rules govern the jurisdiction of the English courts. The first is the 
Brussels regime, comprising the Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001) regulating 
proceedings instituted in the courts of Member States of the EU, including Denmark, before 
10 January 2015, and the Brussels I bis Regulation (also known as the Brussels I Recast) 
(Regulation 1215/2012)87 regulating proceedings instituted in the courts of Member States of 
the EU on or after 10 January 2015. The second is the Lugano Convention, between the 
Member States of the EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which applies only 
as between the EU Member States and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. The 2007 Lugano 
&RQYHQWLRQ¶VWH[WLV, for the most part, identical to that of the Brussels I Regulation. The third 
is the Intra-UK regime,88 which is another variant of the European rules, based on Chapter II 
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of the Brussels regime, allocating jurisdiction as between different parts of the UK.  The fourth 
set is made up of the English traditional rules of jurisdiction, developed by the judges and now 
to be found in the Civil Procedure Rules. In civil and commercial matters, that is, within the 
scope of application of the European regime in this context, the technical basis on which the 
English courts apply the traditional rules is Article 6 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which 
allows national law to apply in cases not caught by the other provisions of the Regulation.89  
 The analysis that follows, however, is solely based on the application of the Brussels 
regime, and within this regime, it only analyses the possibilities that this regime presents for 
bringing the claim before the English courts, rather than a fuller analysis of all the bases of 
jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels regime for this kind of claims. 
Article 4 of the Brussels I bis Regulation stipulates that persons who are domiciled in 
a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State. 
Domicile for a company is defined by Article 63(1) of the Regulation as the place where the 
company has its statutory seat, its central administration or its principal place of business. In 
Article 63(2) it is clarified that in the UK statutory seat means the place where the company 
has its registered office or, where there is no such office, the place of incorporation or, where 
is no such place anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place. This rule 
means that companies incorporated in the UK and/or companies that are effectively run from 
the UK are to be sued in UK courts. As a consequence of this rule, a foreign subsidiary of a 
UK transnational corporation will usually not satisfy these requirements and can, therefore, not 
be sued in English courts based on domicile as a connecting factor. The legal regime established 
by the Brussels Regulation therefore means that companies that are domiciled in the UK can 
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be sued here, even for conduct that they have done elsewhere. Under the Brussels regime, 
English courts are not able to stay proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens.90  
However, courts are able to stay the proceedings in cases where proceedings are 
pending before a court of a third state at the time when a court in a Member State is seized of 
an action involving the same cause of action and between the same parties as the proceedings 
in the court of the third state.91 The condition for a stay of proceedings in this situation is that 
it is expected that the court of the third state will give a judgment capable of recognition and, 
where applicable, of enforcement in that Member State and if the court of the Member State is 
satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper administration of justice. It has been pointed out 
WKDWFRPSDQLHVDVSRWHQWLDOGHIHQGDQWVRIODZVXLWVLQWKH8.PLJKWµFRPPHQFHSURFHHGLQJV
for a declaration of non-OLDELOLW\LQWKHKRVWMXULVGLFWLRQ¶92 Baughen notes that due to Article 
33 of Brussels I bis companies are able to ask the court in the UK to exercise its discretion to 
stay the proceedings based on the fact that they had already commenced proceedings about the 
same cause of action in a third state (ie, a non-Member State of the EU). Given that it is already 
difficult to bring a claim against a UK TNC for torts occurring at its supplier factories, this rule 
restricts those circumstances even further. 
Overall, the rules in Brussels I bis severely limit the ability of victims of human rights 
violations at supplier factories to have their tort claims heard at English courts. In most cases, 
the company that owned the factory where the violation occurred will not be the TNC based in 
the UK, but a foreign company, either a foreign subsidiary, owned by the UK TNC or a foreign 
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supplier which is completely independent. The jurisdiction for lawsuits against foreign 
companies, however, lies with the foreign courts where these companies are domiciled as there 
is no sufficient connection with the UK. Yet, with regards to claims that can be brought against 
TNCs in the UK, the ability to stay proceedings under Brussels I bis further restricts the access 
to remedies for victims of human rights violations at foreign supplier factories, though, 
admittedly, some view the discretionary power brought in by the recast regulation as having 
positive potential.93  
To complete the discussion, we will briefly also refer to choice of court agreements 
here. Where a dispute arises relating to a CSR obligation imposed on a supplier in a global 
supply chain contract, English courts, too, have to apply the different regimes referenced above 
to determine whether or not they can assume jurisdiction. Article 25 of the Brussels I bis 
regulation stipulates that if the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or 
the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen 
or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts 
shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under 
the law of that Member State. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise. As with the applicable law, an analysis of supply chain contracts involving English 
companies has revealed that these commonly include a choice of jurisdiction clause (choice of 
court agreement) outlining that any disputes arising should be heard in English courts.94 
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 C. The Legal Structure of Global Supply Chains 
The difficulties that victims of human rights violations in global supply chains experience in 
bringing tort claims for those violations are further exacerbated by the legal structure of those 
chains. Due to space constraints, we are unable to fully discuss the legal doctrines that 
contribute to those difficulties.95 However, there are two situations that briefly need to be 
addressed here to complement the picture that we have so far established. Global supply chains 
can be organised in a way which includes both foreign subsidiaries of the TNC and/or suppliers 
and sub-suppliers which are not owned by the TNC at the head of the chain and which are only 
linked with it through contract. 
First, in the context of corporate groups consisting of parent companies and their 
subsidiaries, it is important to note that there is no group liability within corporate groups in 
English law. 96 This means that a parent company based (TNC) in the UK is not legally liable 
for the tort liabilities of its subsidiaries, no matter if these are based in the UK or abroad. In the 
case Adams v Cape Industries plc, the Court of Appeal rejected the idea of vicarious liability 
of parent companies for their subsidiaries.97 It dismissed the idea of a single economic unit 
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between the different companies in the group, even in case of a wholly-owned subsidiary. The 
consequence of this approach is that the TNC as the parent company will not be vicariously 
liable for the torts committed by its subsidiaries. English law strictly treats parent and 
subsidiary companies as separate legal entities. The parent company is therefore effectively 
protected from liability. The only way to make the parent company legally liable in tort law is 
to establish that it has itself breached a duty of care that it directly owed to the employees of 
its subsidiaries.  
Second, the structure of global production processes has shifted from the traditional 
parent±overseas subsidiary company situation to a chain of suppliers and sub-suppliers, which 
are only linked with each other by contract.98 This shift makes it even more difficult to hold 
the corporation at the head of the supply chain legally liable as, contrary to subsidiaries, the 
suppliers and their sub-suppliers are not usually owned by the transnational corporation. This 
loose structure consisting of wholly independent companies exacerbates the situation from the 
point of view of providing access to justice for the victims of violations of CSR principles. The 
rules of private international law, discussed above, will make it difficult to apply English law 
to such scenarios or for English courts to assume jurisdiction to hear those claims. The law is 
therefore struggling to catch up with the business realities.99  
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Still, the situation for tort law and contract law differs: whereas current private 
international law regulation in the EU acts as a barrier to promoting greater corporate social 
responsibility in global supply chains in tort law, it acts as a facilitator with regards to contract 
law. However, as the victims of violations of CSR principles at supplier factories do not procure 
a remedy in contract against the transnational corporation through contractual CSR clauses, the 
effect of this difference is likely to be limited.100 The reason is that the enforcement of the 
contractual CSR obligations imposed on suppliers depends on the transnational corporations 
themselves. 
 
E. Summary: The Barriers to Promoting CSR Posed by EU Private 
International Law Rules 
In summary, the European private international law regime is not very conducive to promoting 
transnational human rights in litigation based on tort law. Jurisdiction and applicable law rules 
in the EU regime severely restrict the extraterritorial application of English tort law in respect 
of violations of CSR occurred abroad. In consequence, victims of CSR violations at supplier 
factories overseas have to try and get justice in their own countries. Whilst it can be argued that 
this approach conforms to the territoriality principle of law, it also means that, in practice, the 
access to justice for the victims of harmful corporate conduct is often limited.  
In the absence of a binding international human rights framework on corporations, the 
consequence of this restrictive approach towards extraterritoriality means that the transnational 
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corporations at the head of the supply chain can operate with significant legal impunity.  
Consequently, products that are tainted by modern slavery, for example, are often sold without 
anyone being held liable for this gross human rights abuse. Private international law in its 
European context therefore falls short of providing effective access to justice, which is, after 
all, a key principle of the UNGPs that have been adopted by both the European Union and the 
UK.101 Civil litigation against transnational corporations for torts in their supply chain therefore 
faces both serious procedural (private international law rules) as well as structural (corporate 
structures within groups of companies and networks of suppliers) barriers.102 And as noted the 
systemic territorial principle of public international law reinforces and sustains the juridical 
divisions. These barriers are evident in the case study of the mobile phone industry discussed 
in the next section. 
 
V. Case Study of the Mobile Phone Industry 
In most cities and towns, locating an individual without a smart phone is by far rarer than the 
sighting of a smartphone. Smartphones increasingly are integrated into the daily lives of people 
from every socio-economic background, transcending commonplace economic identifiers 
associated with poverty. In 2015, 1,423.9 million smartphones were sold worldwide and it is 
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anticipated that this number will rise to over 1,800 million by 2020.103 In light of the decreasing 
average price of a smartphone,104 use of these technological gadgets is becoming more 
commonplace than not in the West. Rarely, however, is a thought given to the way in which 
these devices appear in their perfectly designed packages at every other storefront on high 
streets across the West. 
Looking at the resourcing of materials used to create smartphones and the workforce 
used to assemble them, it is clear that responsible supply chain management has not been the 
IRUHIURQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQIRUPRVWRIWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJEUDQGV([DPLQLQJWKHVXSSO\FKDLQIRU
smartphones presents a range of CSR red flags: the use of conflict minerals, poor workplace 
conditions, substandard wages, the use of child labour and e-waste return to developing states 
are just a few of the issues easily identified.  
Since its inception, the smartphone industry has been dominated by a handful of 
manufacturer/suppliers, including Nokia, Motorola and Apple.105 Continued success in the 
markets has been sustained by cost reduction strategies, which inevitably means the movement 
of manufacturing operations to the developing world.106 Developing countries often suffer from 
a lack of both legal and logistics infrastructure. Foreign direct investment has become crucial 
to provide support for basic infrastructure and development. This necessity often results in 
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haphazard investment contracts or bilateral investment treaties that give little consideration to 
the impact on the local population. The smartphone supply chain is undoubtedly complex and 
very bottom-heavy in that the number of supply chain participants is exponentially larger than 
the limited number of major manufacturers.107 Due to space limitations, this chapter will focus 
on the very bottom tier of the supply chain, the use of minerals mined in conflict areas. 
Tin, tantalum and tungsten are three of over 30 minerals found in every smartphone and 
have been widely acknowledged as conflict minerals that fuel the continued internal conflicts 
in several African states.108 Contrary to the claims by many top manufacturers, it is possible to 
ensure conflict-free minerals in the supply chain. Fairphone, a social enterprise business that 
started in 2010, works to deliver a transparent account of its suppliers, including the point of 
origin for minerals contained in its phones. Fairphone works with local conflict-free 
organisations to ensure that these three minerals, typically sourced from conflict-ridden African 
states, are certified conflict-free before entering its supply chain. This source-point attention to 
detail and responsibility takes time, effort and committed manpower, three commitments that 
the largest smartphone manufacturers have been unwilling to abide²time, effort and 
manpower delivered by Fairphone, with less than 50 employees. 
Fairphone is working to educate consumers on the creation of their phones from the 
bottom of the supply chain to the end of the life cycle. While Fairphone does not claim to be 
completely pure in its supply chain and acknowledges that the ills of the supply chain cannot 
EHFXUHGRYHUQLJKWLWKDVLGHQWLILHGµOLWHUDOO\WKRXVDQGVRIVRFLDODQGHFRORJLFDOVWDQGDUGVWKDW
can be improved in the production of smartphones, and [defined] interventions to gradually 
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DGGUHVVVRPHRIWKHP¶109 By partnering with the Conflict Free Tin Initiative (CFTI) and using 
Fairtrade certified gold, Fairphone is pushing toward the most responsible and sustainable 
supply chain in the industry.110 Due to the potential thousands of suppliers that might contribute 
to the production of a single smartphone, responsible supply chain management is clearly not 
straightforward, but that does not mean it is not possible.  
At present, responsible smartphone supply chain management relies on voluntary 
standards due to weak home state regulation or avoidance tactics by large manufacturers that 
would otherwise be required to report potential conflict mineral associations under laws such 
as Dodd-Frank.111 The disjointed home state transparency regulations continue to leave open 
broad gaps that enable smartphone manufacturers to comply with transparency initiatives 
without meaningfully addressing supply chain problems relating to conflict minerals or other 
human rights abuses. With stronger accountability laws in addition to more effective 
transparency regulation, TNCs at the top of the smartphone supply chain will be compelled to 
ensure that they adhere to the CSR agenda.  
 
VI. Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Approach: Transcending the Limits 
of Private and Public International Law 
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by Dodd-Frank, in order to maintain uninterrupted and unexamined supply chains for the specified minerals.  
It is clear that mandatory accountability for human rights violations by TNCs is necessary to 
redress past abuses and those abuses continuingly suffered by countless individuals in 
developing countries.112 Though protection of human rights and accountability is often viewed 
DV µSUHFDULRXV¶113 RUµHOXVLYH¶114 it need not be insurmountable or considered unobtainable. 
The current accountability gap has attracted a range of responses over and above those 
demanded by the soft public international law initiatives previously presented. One suggests 
that an international court be created expressly to cure access to justice issues and reconcile the 
connection between business and human rights violations, with claimants being victims of 
µPDVVWRUWV¶UDWKHUWKDQKXPDQULJKWVYLRODWLRQV115 While an international civil court may be a 
long way off, there are two existing ways in which this gap has been tackled, through the 
passage of stronger legislation and through progressive judicial interpretation of existing law. 
Looking at the US and the UK, we have examples of both. Examples of stronger legislation 
include the Dodd-Frank Act,116 the Torture Victims Protection Act,117 and the UK Modern 
Slavery Act 2015,118 while the line of cases based on the ATS represent the second approach. 
Both approaches have positive and negative aspects.  
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Stronger domestic laws can undoubtedly cure the primary hurdles currently 
experienced in the crusade to hold TNCs accountable for human rights misconduct. Ensuring 
appropriate access to justice in the jurisdiction of the misconduct or for foreign victims of abuse 
LQWKH71&¶VVWDWHRILQFRUSRUDWLRQRUKHDGTXDUWHUVZRXOGHQDEOHPDQ\WRVHHNUHGUHVVZKHUH
they otherwise would be left without an avenue along which they might pursue justice. 
However, this alone will not fully repair the current problems with human rights accountability. 
National courts are not guaranteed to deliver a universal interpretation of human rights.119 This 
is particularly true due to the reinterpretation of human rights violations as private law claims. 
Commentators have suggested that approaches not employing the language of human rights, a 
civil tort suit for example, do not fulfil the object of human rights law.120 This chapter asserts 
otherwise. Whether under the guise of criminal, tort or some other legal designation, the key 
must be that individual victims of human rights abuse get access to justice. Streamlining all 
cases as human rights law breaches is the ideal, but should not any step forward be viewed as 
progress? 
Given the significant obstacles to the promotion of CSR in supply chains in both public 
and private international law, it is important to develop a framework that overcomes the barriers 
discussed so far. To that end, we propose a hybrid regulatory system that transcends the limits 
of private and public international law approach and which will, consequently, help reconcile 
CSR and supply chain management.121 In our proposed hybrid approach, different regulatory 
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instruments would work together, including hard law, soft law, public international law, private 
international law and domestic law. It is argued that due to the myriad of challenges facing 
responsible supply chain management, it is necessary to rely upon a variety of different 
regulatory instruments. Both public and private international law present different hurdles for 
promoting CSR in global supply chains, particularly due to the way extraterritoriality is 
approached and due to the legal position and structures of the TNCs in those supply chains. 
However, it is argued here that it is possible to overcome these limitations without having to 
change the deeply entrenched doctrine of separate legal personality and the European 
Regulations regarding applicable law and jurisdiction. Our model would aim to steer the 
behaviour of transnational corporations through the creative use of domestic laws in the home 
state of transnational corporations through a combination of extraterritorial corporate criminal 
liability and more stringent transparency laws. 
  
A. The Strategic Use of Home State Regulation 
Whilst it is admitted that the international regulation of transnational corporations would have 
the potential to achieve a more consistent and more coherent approach, no such framework is 
expected anytime soon. In the absence of such an international approach, small steps of 
addressing corporate power in the home state can achieve incremental change that leads toward 
reconciliation of human rights and supply chain management. This would prevent TNCs from 
merely paying lip-service to CSR, but rather push them to fully integrate CSR into their 
management strategies. The creative use of home state regulation can help fill the regulatory 
gaps that global supply chains exhibit in terms of human rights protection. The hybrid approach 
that we propose is capable of overcoming the three main challenges of the present situation 
that we identified above: first, the limitations that the absence of binding international human 
rights duties on corporations; second, the barriers towards extraterritorial civil litigation in the 
European private international law framework; third, the difficulty of holding transnational 
corporations vicariously liable in tort for the unlawful conduct of their subsidiaries or their 
suppliers. 
The strategic use of domestic law can particularly rely on corporate criminal law and 
transparency regulations. The former assertion is based on the model set out in the UK Bribery 
Act 2010 which makes the failure of commercial organisation to prevent bribery by a person 
associated with it a criminal offence.122 There is no requirement that the bribery occurred within 
the UK.123 The offence therefore has an extraterritorial dimension. What is required is that the 
offending company must be involved in business and be constituted in or carry on business or 
part of its business in the UK.124 Whilst it is unclear to what extent this criminal offence 
encompasses suppliers, it can be argued that regular suppliers are included.125 Notably, a 
company has a statutory defence if it can prove that it had adequate procedures in place 
designed to prevent associated persons from engaging in bribery.126 7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
guidance expressly mentions GXHGLOLJHQFHPHFKDQLVPVDVµDGHTXDWHSURFHGXUHV¶supporting 
this defence.127 Due diligence is a key principle highlighted by the UNGPs. 
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The model of the UK Bribery Act could be used for severe human rights violations in 
global supply chains such as forced labour, child labour and the exposure to very unsafe 
working conditions. In fact, it was suggested by some NGOs in the legislative process leading 
to the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 that a criminal offence modelled on the Bribery Act should 
be the legislative choice for addressing modern slavery in global supply chains.128 However, 
this proposal was rejected in favour of the transparency clause.129 The advantage of the 
approach taken in the Bribery Act is the indirect imposition of due diligence requirements on 
FRPSDQLHV:KLOVWWKHWKUHDWRIWKHFULPLQDORIIHQFHFDQEHVHHQDVWKHµVWLFN¶WKHGHIHQFHRI
GXHGLOLJHQFHLVWKHµFDUURW¶ It could therefore steer corporate behaviour away from the current 
voluntary and haphazard approach to CSR toward a more consistent, integrated CSR 
compliance system within a broader responsible supply chain management plan. CSR due 
diligence is thereby given a more prominent position than it currently has in many corporations.  
At the moment, TNCs often send mixed messages about their approach to CSR to suppliers. 
Whereas the purchase department often pushes for short-term and low-cost production, CSR 
department policies are seen as an additional burden on suppliers.130 However, the law needs 
to ensure that companies integrate CSR into their entire supply chain management and do not 
WUHDWLWDVDQµDGGRQ¶.  
The proposed model gives CSR a more prominent standing than it has at present. This 
approach could overcome the limitations of public and private international law that contribute 
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to the current neglect of CSR in supply chain management. The approach based on corporate 
criminal liability also touches on an issue discussed throughout the chapter: the idea of 
extraterritorial laws and jurisdiction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is jurisdiction over an offence 
which has no connection with the territory of England or Wales, or other state in which the 
claim is being made.131 English courts only deal with conduct that is an offence against English 
law.132 They have jurisdiction over those criminal offences committed within the boundary of 
England and Wales.133 However, there are examples of extraterritorial jurisdiction being 
exercised in respect of British citizens for crimes, such as murder and manslaughter, committed 
in a country or territory outside the UK.134 The offence established by the Bribery Act is a 
further example of when the English courts could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. There 
are currently few instances where a state is able to exercise jurisdiction for activity outside the 
normal territorial limits of its jurisdiction without domestic law specifically crafted to override 
the extraterritoriality limitations recognised by both public and private international law.  
 
B. Steps Toward the Hybrid Regulatory Approach 
Ultimately, the best approach to reconciling human rights and supply chain management would 
be a private international law instrument that could effectively deliver a process for dealing 
ZLWKµIRUHLJQ-FXEHG¶FODLPVE\FODULI\LQJRSWLRns of choice of law and forum. Until that time, 
the following briefly outlines our views for a hybrid regulatory approach that will strengthen 
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CSR in global supply chains. Step one is for home states to implement strict domestic 
transparency regulation for all TNCs operating outwith the home state. Such transparency 
regulation must include broad coverage of different types of business actors and mandate 
reporting in respect to all levels of the supply chain, including the most far-removed supplier. 
Stricter transparency regulation should also demand a well-defined design, featuring 
differentiated, clear and measurable reporting requirements and, in particular, binding 
reporting about WKH71&¶Vdue diligence mechanisms, external audits of its supply chain and 
facts and figures about human rights violations in its supply chain that were detected.  
Step two sees the home state imposing a due diligence obligation on all TNCs to protect 
against human rights abuse at every level of operation and a corresponding right to access 
remedy in the home state for victims when due diligence failures result in extraterritorial human 
rights abuse, reflecting international human rights law. Tracking the UN Framework approach 
to remedy, this could include administrative procedures or other non-judicial procedures in 
addition to tort liability. Equally, the failure of due diligence mechanisms could lead to criminal 
liability, such as in the Bribery Act model. In any case, what is important is that TNCs must no 
longer be able to avoid liability by purely paying lip-service to due diligence mechanisms 
without having a coherent and meaningful approach to supply chain due diligence that would 
significantly reduce the risk of human rights violations in their supply chain. Thus, step two 
sees public international law norms informing private law claims in the home state. 
Step three concerns the actions that TNCs take on the basis of the legal environment 
created by more stringent transparency regulation, due diligence obligations and corresponding 
liability potential in their home states. TNCs will need to react to new legal requirements, 
particularly by establishing supply chain due diligence. TNCs can choose how to meet the 
requirements of the home state laws, for example, how to incorporate CSR policies into their 
private supplier relationships (eg in supply chain contracts) and which due diligence procedures 
to impose on their suppliers. The third step therefore further entrenches the public-private link 
upon which our hybrid model is built. TNCs can, for instance, choose to incorporate public 
international soft law standards on CSR issues such as the UN Framework. These non-binding 
instruments then become binding between the TNCs and their suppliers through the power of 
contract law. Thus, the hybrid approach builds upon existing opportunities in domestic law to 
allow public international law to inform regulatory choices and responses thereto.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Global supply chains have become synonymous with human rights violations. It is apparent 
that the CSR policies of TNCs have made few improvements in the working conditions in many 
supplier factories at the bottom of global supply chains. This is due to a number of legal 
challenges inherent in regulating such chains. Our chapter has sought to outline a legal 
framework designed to push for improvement of the all-too-often ineffective CSR instruments 
in the supply chain management of TNCs. 
To that end, the chapter demonstrated that currently public and private international law 
neither jointly or separately deliver the magic formula in terms of reconciling human rights and 
supply chain management. Strong, directed cross-border regulation building on existing 
domestic private law and softer public international law instruments, such as the UNGPs, could 
overcome some of the barriers identified above. Strengthening transparency regulation does 
little to serve the immediate interests of victims of human rights violations thus we further 
outlined the need for clear avenues for access to justice for due diligence failures by TNCs. 
Upon reflection and multiple iterations of our options, it is clear that further refined private 
international law rules, tailored to tackle the challenges posed by supply chain management in 
cross-border cases, could aid promoting CSR via both choice of law rules as well as providing 
for more adequate bases of jurisdiction in order to provide a better chance for victims to access 
justice. As set out at the beginning of this chapter, it is the victims that have fallen through the 
cracks in the law generated by the boundaries of existing public and private international law 
frameworks. Ultimately, it will take bold legal solutions to redress the current inadequacies of 
CSR in supply chain management. This chapter has outlined short turnaround approaches based 
on stronger home state transparency and due diligence regulation. We recognise, however, that 
ultimately, only a new subject-specific private international law instrument has the potential to 
overcome the existing public and private international law boundaries and ensure effective 
CSR and responsible supply chain management that respects and protects human rights. 
 
